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Abstract 
Many policies hinge on determining whether someone's situation is 
due to luck or choice. In political philosophy, this prevalence is 
mirrored by luck egalitarian theories. But overemphasizing the 
distinction between luck and choice will lead to tensions with the 
value of moral agency, on which the distinction is grounded. Here, 
we argue that the two most common contemporary critiques of luck 
egalitarianism, holding it to be harsh and disrespectful are best 
understood as illustrating this tension. Elaborating on this conflict, 
we argue that it should lead us to modify how luck and choice are 
used in theories of justice. 
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Political debates are saturated with policies that hinge on a distinction between 
luck and choice. Unemployment benefits, for example, are often conditional on 
whether someone’s joblessness is due to bad luck in terms of marketable talents 
or a choice not to work. Health care policies, similarly, often discriminate 
between, say, the unlucky bearers of genetic diseases and people with unhealthy 
lifestyles. In political theory, this saturation is mirrored by theorists who hold 
that a just society is one that emphasizes the distinction between luck and choice, 
ensuring that no one is worse off than others through mere bad luck—that is, 
through no fault or choice of their own (Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Dworkin 1982; 
Knight 2009; Lippert-Rasmussen 2016; Temkin 2003b). In Ronald Dworkin’s well-
known formulation, this means that for a (societal) distribution of resources to 
be just, it must be endowment-insensitive but ambition-sensitive (Dworkin 1982). 
While the locus of such theories is the distinction between luck and choice, it is 
not always clear why this distinction is taken to hold such importance. The most 
plausible ground, we claim, is that the distinction is given importance through 
its fundamental connection to moral agency. For a number of theories that center 
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on the luck/choice distinction, a closer look reveals that the distinction is 
considered important for precisely this reason. Thus, respecting people’s choices 
is important because such choices are a product of moral agency (Arneson 1999; 
Dworkin 2000, chap. 1; Lippert-Rasmussen 2016, chap. 2). Luck, on the other 
hand, does not originate in moral agency and, thus, should not be treated with 
similar respect (Otsuka 2002; Stemplowska 2008). With this grounding in mind, 
it becomes clear why distributions of benefits and burdens should reflect people’s 
choices, but not natural and social contingencies—and why, as in our 
introductory examples, unemployment benefits and health care policies should 
track the choices people make. 
In this article, however, we claim that hinging one’s theory on the distinction 
between luck and choice sometimes causes tension with the very value upon 
which the distinction is founded: moral agency. Because of such potential tension 
and because the value of moral agency is more fundamental, the role of the 
luck/choice distinction in both politics and political theory should be 
reconsidered and modified to accentuate other dimensions than those usually 
brought to the fore by luck egalitarians. 
The tension between moral agency and the luck/choice distinction comes to light 
in two different ways. First, critics (Anderson 1999; Fleurbaey 1995) raise the 
harshness objection, which warns against letting people suffer the consequences 
of their irresponsible choices when this entails leaving severely injured people in 
dire straits. While leaving them to their fate may be understood as a way of 
respecting their (past) choices, it fails to respect their (future) possibilities for 
moral agency. Focus, we argue, should be on how to ensure the moral agency of 
the unemployed and the unhealthy going forward, rather than evaluating their 
past choices and compensating them for bad luck. We should, in other words, 
prioritize forward-looking, rather than merely focusing on backward-looking, 
moral agency. 
Second, the disrespect objection objects to the practice of probing and 
questioning individuals in order to evaluate whether their situation is due to luck 
or choice. A tension can occur, according to this objection, in the determination 
of whether someone has been responsible or not because this very judgement can 
involve invasive inquiries that fail to respect the agential status of the judged 
(Wolff 1998; Anderson 1999). A society committed to respecting the moral agency 
of its citizens, not only ensures that their capacities to act as moral agents are in 
place, but also treats them in a certain manner; as moral agents are to be treated 
(Schemmel 2012). Seeking to determine exercised agency often involves 
questioning or second-guessing people’s agential capacities. And this can be in 
tension with treating them as moral agents in a non-consequentialist sense. Thus, 
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the luck/choice distinction can be objected to on the grounds that it is often 
accompanied by treatment that is not consistent with how moral agents ought to 
be treated. 
Once we understand these critiques in light of the notion of moral agency, we 
discover that both critiques point to a conflict between this founding value of 
justice and the luck egalitarian concern with luck and choice. We call this the 
unity thesis. 
The Unity Thesis: prominent critiques of luck egalitarian theories of 
distributive justice point to a general tension between the luck/choice 
distinction and the more fundamental principle of respecting moral 
agency. 
This reformulation of luck egalitarian critiques as a fundamental normative 
tension, reconstructs the debate in order to get a better grasp of the reasons and 
values at stake and, simultaneously, defends the notion that these two critiques 
are based on the same fundamental tension between standard luck egalitarianism 
and moral agency. But, importantly, studying this clash also teaches us something 
more generally about when and why individual responsibility is valuable. And 
while luck egalitarian theories and political ideas about individual responsibility 
contain important insights, these critiques, when properly reconstructed, show 
us that the backward-looking and purely outcome-oriented version, in which 
moral agency is standardly employed in luck egalitarianism, is inadequate to 
protect and properly respect this value. This, we argue, gives us reasons to dismiss 
luck egalitarianism, as it has thus far been depicted, and recapture the intuition 
of sensitivity to responsible choice in what we shall call moral agency 
egalitarianism.  
I. Moral Agency and Luck Egalitarian Justice 
To gain a deeper understanding of the notion of justice entailed in luck 
egalitarian theories, it is helpful to take a step back and look at the more 
fundamental question of why it is a matter of justice how persons fare relative to 
each other – a question which is sometimes referred to as the basis of equality 
(Carter 2011). When luck egalitarians claim that justice requires a choice-sensitive 
distribution, they are making a claim about what is entailed by egalitarian 
justice—about how we, distributively, ought to respond to the fact that persons 
are moral equals (or, at least, ought to be treated as such). And, in theorizing 
about the implications of moral equality, they are implicitly relying on statements 
about why (all) persons (and only persons) are equals. After all, theories of justice 
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are usually limited to persons and, thus, must rely on a feature of persons which 
makes them and only them (equal) bearers of justice claims.1 
This question of “basic equality” has been comparatively neglected in political 
philosophy. However, a promising range of replies are grounded in moral agency 
(Carter 2011; Parr & Slavny 2019; Rawls 1971, §77; Williams 2005). What makes it 
appropriate to include persons (and only persons) within the scope of egalitarian 
justice, according to this view, is that persons are moral agents and that this 
commands a certain treatment. Bernard Williams, for example, notes “a certain 
human desire to be identified with what one is doing, to be able to realize 
purposes of one’s own, and not to be the instrument of another’s will unless one 
has voluntarily accepted such a role” (Williams 2005, 100). John Rawls, along 
related lines, delineates the scope of egalitarian justice to “moral persons,” who 
are defined as having a conception of the good and a sense of justice (Rawls 1971, 
505). While the replies of Carter, Williams, and Rawls to this basic question differ 
in their specifics, they concur that egalitarian justice is grounded in people’s 
(capacity for) moral agency. The unifying idea is that persons have equal claims 
of justice due to their capacity for constructing, revising, and pursuing plans and 
purposes in the light of the plans and purposes of others—for short, the capacity 
to exercise moral agency.2 This capacity gives persons a claim on conditions and 
resources needed to construct and follow their plans and warrants a certain 
treatment; as someone who has plans of their own and is able to reconsider them.3 
Interestingly, luck egalitarians often rely on a similar notion of moral agency in 
their accounts. Dworkin, for example, grounds much of his political philosophy 
on a small set of fundamental ethical principles. His theory of equality of 
resources, which has grown to be a cornerstone of luck egalitarian theorizing, is 
constructed around the assumptions that the success of each human life is of 
equal objective importance, and that it is immanent in that success that human 
persons exercise responsibility and choice over their own lives (Dworkin 2000, 5-
6).4 Like in Rawls and Williams’ descriptions, Dworkin’s reference to the 
importance of choosing one’s path seems to be tied, at a fundamental level, to the 
value of moral agency.5 
 
1 And which excludes, for example, potatoes from being (equal) bearers of justice claims. 
2 See Parr & Slavny (2019) for a very systematic argument in favour of this idea. 
3 See Rawls (1971), §77 for the former point, Carter (2011) for the latter, and Williams (2005) for both. 
4 See also Dworkin (2011), 203-204, in which he elaborates further on the connection to moral 
agency, relying on the principles of self-respect and authenticity. See also Clayton (2016). 
5 See also Arneson’s (1999) reflections on this issue. While his arguments are mainly concerned with 
showing that it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between humans and non-human animals 
when determining the scope of principles of justice, they nonetheless point toward the idea that 
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Dworkin, thus, recognizes the centrality of moral agency in political morality. 
This seems to be true for other, more unambiguously luck egalitarian, accounts 
of justice as well. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen in Luck Egalitarianism, for example, 
claims that what a just society should aim to distribute equally is “that which 
[people] care about non-instrumentally and not unreasonably so” (Lippert-
Rasmussen 2016, 135) and that people’s equal moral standing is grounded in “their 
capacity to be non-instrumentally concerned with things in a distinctive way, say, 
one that involves long-term planning” (ibid, 61). What distributive justice aims 
at, then—why it is important—is enabling people to live and choose in 
accordance with their (long-term) plans, and specifically, non-instrumental 
concerns—and enabling this (equally) for everyone (Meijers & Vandamme 2019). 
People’s capacity for moral agency, in other words, seems to be the very reason 
that we care about how benefits and burdens are distributed among them. Many 
luck egalitarians, then, accept and even explicitly appeal to moral agency as a 
grounding value of their account.6 For these theorists, the tension we point to is 
problematic for reasons internal to their theory; because it points to a potential 
value clash within their theoretical framework.  
Other luck egalitarian theorists, like Cohen, remain vague on the issue of why 
people have claims of justice, sometimes appealing to fairness, but deliberately 
sidestepping the deeper question of what it is about persons that makes them 
bearers of claims of justice, fairness, or otherwise (Cohen 2006). For such 
theorists, our claim that their theoretical commitments are sometimes in tension 
with moral agency, pushes them towards answering the more basic question of 
why persons are bearers of claims of justice if not due to their status as moral 
agents. 
Specifically, the clashes arise because of the particular, narrow way in which 
moral agency is employed in luck egalitarianism. Recall that luck egalitarianism 
holds that it is unjust if some people are worse off than others through no fault 
or choice of their own (Arneson 1989; 2000; Cohen 1989; 2006; Lippert-
Rasmussen 2001, 2016). This is also often phrased as a concern with exercises of 
personal responsibility (Dworkin 2000, 287-288; Lippert-Rasmussen 2016, chap. 
2). Thus, it is crucial for luck egalitarianism to track the extent to which people’s 
fortunes are due to luck or choice. For Dworkin, it matters that everyone has an 
equal opportunity space (or, as he would say, an equal share of resources) for 
 
the scope of principles of justice is relevantly tied to considerations of rational agency (122) and 
affection (126-127). 
6 Within theories of egalitarian justice, we might say, there is something akin to a ‘thicker’ version 
of Will Kymlicka’s “egalitarian plateau” (2002, 4), upon which theories of justice, more broadly, are 
constructed. What we might call a “moral agential plateau”. 
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living in accordance with their choices, for pursuing their own conception of the 
good life.  
In emphasizing the connection between past exercises of responsibility and 
distributive outcomes, luck egalitarians standardly accentuate one dimension of 
moral agency. We might call this manner of respecting moral agency backward-
looking responsibility (Feiring 2008; van de Poel 2011); respecting people’s past 
exercises of moral agency, compensating them if their poor situation is due to 
(past) bad luck, but not if it is due to (past) bad choices.  
Another aspect of how the luck/choice distinction is used in luck egalitarian 
theories is worth mentioning. Specifically, luck egalitarianism is a theory of 
distributive justice, conceptualizing justice as a specific distributive 
(responsibility-sensitive) pattern. The role of moral agency revolves around 
ensuring that distributive outcomes reflect people’s exercises of past agency. This 
concern with distributive outcomes is central, of course, because distributions 
govern whether people have the resources, opportunities, capabilities, etc. 
needed to construct, revise, and pursue their plans for the good life—i.e. to live 
as moral agents. 
But respect for moral agency, we claim, is broader than distributive outcomes and 
its backward-looking elements. Part of what it is to respect someone as a moral 
agent has to do with looking to the past and letting them bear the costs (or reap 
the benefits) of former choices. Were this not the case, no one would, as William’s 
put it, “identify with what one is doing” (Williams 2005, 100). But, first, respect 
for moral agency also requires ensuring that people have the required resources, 
opportunities, capabilities, etc. needed to construct, revise, and pursue their 
plans for the good life going forward. In other words, it entails a concern with 
forward-looking responsibility; whether people are able to make responsible 
choices going forward (Feiring 2008; van de Poel 2011). Whether, in other words, 
they have the resources needed to exercise moral agency in the future—
independently of which choices they have made in the past. If moral agency 
denotes the capacity to realize one’s own projects, distributions must be 
responsibility-sensitive in a way that captures this forward-looking aspects of 
being an agent too. 7 This concern with the forward-looking dimension of moral 
agency, we argue, is at the heart of the harshness objection. 
Second, respect for moral agency requires a concern not only for the distributive 
outcomes that persons face but also how they are treated. A just society, grounded 
on respect for moral agency, is one in which citizens treat each other, and the 
 
7 See also Emily McTernan (2015) who argues that practices of holding people responsible should 
be judged on whether or not they promote egalitarian values. 
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state treats them, as it is appropriate to treat moral agents—independently of 
distributive outcomes. Moral agents, for example, should not be treated with 
distrust or a lack of common courtesy and should not be made to demean 
themselves (Wolff 1998, 107-110). Respect for persons with the capacity for 
constructing, revising, and pursuing plans and purposes, who do so in the light 
of the plans and purposes of others, precludes such treatment. Moral agents 
should be treated with the courtesy, trust, and respect of someone acting on well-
conceived motives and with the interests of others in mind. In Carter’s (2011) 
words, moral agents are to be treated with opacity respect; certain agential 
capacities should be assumed in people and they should be treated accordingly. 
This is significant because it entails that a concern for moral agency cannot focus 
solely on distributive outcomes but must also attend to how these outcomes 
come about and how states treat and relate to their citizens even when this does 
not impact distributive outcomes. Respect for moral agency, then, entails 
considerations that are broader than distributive outcomes. This, we argue, is 
what is at the heart of the disrespect objection. 
These two ways in which standard luck egalitarianism fails to incorporate respect 
for moral agency, thus, underlie two of the main critiques with which their focus 
on the luck/choice distinction has been met. And while luck egalitarians might 
object that the conception of moral agency which underlies their theories does 
not (and ought not) incorporate forward-looking and non-distributive elements, 
our reconstruction of these two critiques will show why a proper appreciation of 
moral agency means that it should. 
 
II. Harshness 
First, luck egalitarianism has been accused of being unreasonably harsh. The 
theory is charged with having the implication that we should let imprudent 
choosers suffer the consequences of their choices—even when these leave them 
very badly off. This issue has traditionally been portrayed as demonstrating that 
luck egalitarianism is too harsh on bad choosers, either by allowing them to be 
left with unacceptably bad outcomes compared to their imprudence (Fleurbaey 
1995), or by failing to show equal respect and concern towards them by 
“abandoning the negligent” (Anderson 1999, 296).8 More specifically, asking a 
reckless driver or a helmetless motorcyclist to internalize the costs of her 
imprudence, might entail leaving the person with severe health deficiencies and 
 
8 Like Anderson, Nicholas Barry argues that the abandonment critique suggests “that egalitarian 
justice contains more than one core principle” (2006, 99). We argue, instead, that the critique 
suggests that luck egalitarianism is an imperfect instantiation of the more fundamental notion of 
moral agency. 
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injuries (or, alternatively, place crippling financial costs on her if asking her to 
shoulder the medical expenses). This, on a strict reading of luck egalitarianism, 
seems to be the appropriate way of respecting her choices in the backward-
looking sense—since it would be unfair to impose the costs of her recklessness 
on others. 
The harshness objection has been widely discussed, interpreted in a number of 
different ways, and luck egalitarians have given several replies (Albertsen 2016b; 
Albertsen & Midtgaard 2013; Cohen 2008; Knight 2005, 2015: Lippert-Rasmussen 
2016, chap. 6; Stemplowska 2017; Voight 2007). These include downplaying the 
genuineness of people’s choices and the extent to which these costs should be 
borne by victims of imprudence. While these replies help luck egalitarians avoid 
the most extreme outcomes of the critique, however, they remain committed to 
the core luck egalitarian idea of ensuring a distributively just outcome of the 
effects of past exercises of choice—that is, only the backward-looking dimensions 
of moral agency.  
The harshness critique can be reconstructed in light of the considerations about 
moral agency outlined above, and this helps us see the reasons and values at play 
in the disagreement more clearly. Rather than being a disagreement about the 
reasonable implications of past choices, this is better understood as an 
instantiation of the unity thesis; as a tension between emphasizing the backward-
looking dimensions of the luck/choice distinction and respecting the more 
fundamental value of moral agency. And while most luck egalitarians are not 
committed to the extreme outcomes placed in the spotlight by the harshness 
critique, this does not impact our broader claim that justice requires 
deemphasizing backward-looking concerns and preserving forward-looking 
exercises of moral agency. In this way, the harshness objection can be 
reconstructed as a disagreement about whether the emphasis on luck and choice 
should be allowed to undercut its own normative basis; respect for people’s moral 
agency.9  
And as Zofia Stemplowska notes, no matter how luck egalitarians choose to 
respond to the harshness objection, they cannot avoid the problem entirely. 
Indeed, it seems reasonable to say that luck egalitarians are committed to biting 
the bullet of the harshness objection at least in its very general form; that 
sometimes, justice entails “leaving people to bear even terribly heavy 
disadvantages” rather than allowing them to impose these costs on others 
 
9 Instead of saying that it is a tension between two ways of respecting moral agency, Alexander 
Brown holds that it is a tension between two values which feed into a broad notion of responsibility; 
fairness and human flourishing (Brown 2005, 33-36). We take this to be compatible with our 
argument here. 
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(Stemplowska 2009, 254).10 They are committed to doing so because, otherwise, 
they would be giving up backward-looking responsibility completely and their 
view would no longer be luck egalitarian. Stemplowska, as an illustration, asks 
the reader to imagine “a mountain climber who insists on going uninsured and 
unprepared on numerous mountain expeditions,” and whose rescue imposes 
significant costs on others. She asks: “[s]hould the climber’s claim on the 
resources win each time against the claims of others in virtue of the fact that if he 
or she does not get the resources he or she will be left to die?” (2009, 252). Again, 
if the luck/choice distinction is to have the crucial role that luck egalitarians and 
others ascribe to it, surely their reply must be no (Albertsen 2016b). At some 
point, the climber must be held accountable and justice, thusly, must entail 
harshness. 
Dworkin seeks to pre-emptively protect himself from the harshness objection by 
allowing for the protection of basic rights through compulsory insurance.11 But, 
even so, given the emphasis on luck and choice in Dworkin’s general framework, 
it seems that at some point the climber should be abandoned because of the 
irresponsibility of their choice – in order to respect this choice. Thus, it seems 
implausible, on Dworkin’s conception, that compulsory insurance schemes 
would cover continuously imposing such costs onto others. A luck egalitarian 
might very well, in accordance with Stemplowska’s claim, favour such a 
conclusion. 
Importantly, however, this need not be detrimental to the idea of ensuring that 
people are respected as choosers, which is at the core of luck egalitarianism, but 
careful consideration is needed if we are to understand the prospect of a 
responsibility-sensitive account of justice which respects moral agency. More 
careful attention needs to be paid to the roles given to backward and forward-
looking responsibility, respectively, and, in particular, when the two are in 
tension. 
To see this problem more clearly, consider a wealthy, luck egalitarian society, 
Beverly Hills, in which everyone began with an equal and ample share of society’s 
resources: 
Hiking in Beverly Hills: Semolina Pilchard decides to go hiking in 
the steep local hills, despite him having no health insurance and 
 
10 Note that these terrible disadvantages could be either in the form of insufficiencies or large 
inequalities (which might also create obstacles for moral agency). See Axelsen & Nielsen (2015) for 
thoughts about the intimate connections between obstacles created by inequalities and 
insufficiency. 
11 Dworkin (2011), 361. See also Parr (2015), 168-169. 
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despite wearing flip-flops. While climbing, Semolina has an accident, 
which brings him below what is needed for moral agency. Everyone 
else in society have been prudent and hard-working and has 
abundantly more than what is required to exercise their moral 
agency.  
In the example, imposing the costs required to restore Semolina to the capacity 
required for moral agency on others would infringe on their equal shares. 
Consequently, doing so would be at odds with luck egalitarian justice. In the 
absence of redistribution, the distributive outcome reflects the past choices of 
Semolina and his co-citizens.  
Imposing the costs required to restore Semolina to an adequate level on others 
would not, however, threaten their absolute capabilities for moral agency in a 
forward-looking sense—being very wealthy, his co-citizens have much more than 
enough already. Respect for moral agency in the forward-looking sense, it 
appears, gives us no reason not to redistribute from Semolina’s fellow citizens 
who have much more than they need for their agential projects. Moreover, 
redistribution to save Semolina is required, in order to respect his continued 
moral agency, since without redistribution, in cases such as this, there will be no 
further agency to respect. 
Hiking in Beverly Hills brings out an underlying issue regarding the significance 
of relative versus absolute shares. Luck egalitarians care about comparative 
exercises of responsible choice because this is necessary to determine the just-
qua-responsibility-sensitive distribution of scarce resources. Respecting moral 
agency in a forward-looking sense, on the other hand, emphasizes ensuring that 
everyone has what is needed for the exercise of their agential capacities. Doing 
so, furthermore, does not require that everyone has an equal share of resources. 
Instead, it requires a sufficient share of society’s resources. Moral agency is 
inherently a “threshold” concept (Raz 1986, chapter 7).12 Here, then, is a genuine 
tension; luck egalitarianism prioritizes a backward-looking concern with equal 
shares over ensuring the absolute forward-looking capacities for moral agency. 
And luck egalitarians do so even when ensuring such capacities would not imperil 
anyone else’s capacities for moral agency. 
This way of understanding the harshness objection, furthermore, sheds new light 
on how the harshness objection has sometimes been framed by its originators. In 
another luck egalitarian critique, Elizabeth Anderson writes, that “it is no great 
insult for a state to pass laws requiring the use of seat belts” because, she 
continues, “self-respecting people can endorse some paternalistic laws as simply 
 
12 See also Huseby (2017); Nielsen (2016); Parr & Slavny (2019); and Shields (2016), chapter 3. 
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protecting themselves from their own thoughtlessness” (Anderson 1999: 301). 
Compared to the harshness-objection to the reckless driver case, the difference 
seems to be about the degree of infringement on moral agency. Seat belt laws are 
justifiable, despite being to some extent freedom-reducing, because they protect 
future exercises of moral agency, while not bringing persons below the threshold 
of the capacity for such exercises. Leaving people to die on the roadside, on the 
other hand, leaves no space at all for continuing agency. 
Importantly, however, luck egalitarians can agree with Stemplowska’s claim that 
harsh outcomes must be accepted at some point, without accepting that they 
should be accepted in Semolina’s case. They can incorporate this idea in different 
ways. One way of doing so is to agree that the objection does, indeed, target an 
important issue but one that has to do with other values than justice such as 
sufficiency, basic need fulfilment, community, etc. (Cohen 2009, 37; Segall 2007). 
What we may call the externalizing strategy entails deemphasizing the 
significance of the value of justice in determining what is important and what to 
do (Axelsen & Bidadanure 2019). The externalizing strategy enables luck 
egalitarians to insist that imposing costs on others for the sake of saving Semolina 
is a violation of justice while still recognizing that Semolina should nonetheless 
be saved, all things considered (Temkin 2017).   
This strategy, of course, is only open to luck egalitarians such as Cohen who 
deliberately sidestep the question of the value upon which justice is grounded. In 
some ways, it is a promising reply in that it recognizes the force of the harshness 
objection and the threat to moral agency it constitutes. But, in not specifying a 
grounding value, luck egalitarians end up being unreasonably indeterminate 
about what we should actually do because they fail to provide a way to choose 
between and weigh these different values (Meijers & Vandamme 2019). When 
emphasizing backward-looking responsibility is in tension with respecting 
forward-looking moral agency, as in the case of Semolina, how does one 
determine what to do? More concerning, from the point of view of this article, 
how does one determine what to do if not by looking to moral agency?  
In the absence of clear reasons to ground the idea of why persons have claims of 
justice (or fairness), the externalizing strategy looks unconvincing—or, at least, 
severely incomplete. And this is because the strategy fails to deliver a reason for 
why backward-looking responsibility should be respected when doing so is in 
tension with other values; it is unclear to what extent and even why imposing 
costs on those that have enough for exercising moral agency in order to help those 
that have too little is problematic in any way. Thus, it fails to provide grounds for 
why we should concern ourselves with preserving the equal, but abundant shares 
of Semolina’s co-citizens, and let this concern override—or even be weighed 
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against—preserving Semolina’s opportunities to exercise moral agency going 
forward.  
More promisingly, we could embrace the responsibility-sensitive intuitions in 
another way. Setting aside the luck egalitarian inclination to align distributive 
outcomes with past choices, we could still accept that holding people responsible 
for their choices is one way of respecting moral agency—namely, by treating their 
past choices as reflections of such. It is showing respect for Semolina’s moral 
agency, on this view, to let him suffer the consequences of his uninsured hiking. 
But in taking this route, we should admit, additionally, that other dimensions of 
moral agency must be incorporated into the policies of a just society—in 
particular, the importance of ensuring the future exercise of moral agency (Brown 
2005) or other valuable egalitarian practices and relations (McTernan 2015, 3). 
Such an alternative responsibility-sensitive view would hold that forward-looking 
responsibility should take priority when clashing with the desire to uphold a 
distribution on the basis of backward-looking responsibility. Moral agency 
egalitarianism, as we might call this view, would reach the right verdict in Hiking 
in Beverly Hills case and opt for redistribution to Semolina from her prudent, but 
opulent, co-citizens. This modified view has a further advantage: it gives a 
straightforward and intuitive reply to cases of harshness. It says that we should 
avoid harsh outcomes because these constitute clear and immediate threats to 
people’s plans and intentions and, thus, their ability to act as a moral agent. 13 In 
other words, it does not only give us the right verdict; that we should not abandon 
Semolina – which some luck egalitarian replies also reach – but it does so for the 
right reasons; because we want to guarantee people’s capacities for exercising 
moral agency.  
To see how this view retains its responsibility-sensitive core, consider a situation 
similar to Hiking in Beverly Hills, in which Semolina, again, goes hiking and 
suffers an accident. This time, however, his many careless accidents have, over 
time, depleted the resources of his co-citizens and, thus, restoring Semolina’s 
capacity to a level adequate for exercising moral agency would hinder not only 
the equal, but the absolute capabilities for moral agency of others.14 Rescuing 
Semolina, in other words, would involve such exorbitant costs that it could not 
be covered without imposing costs on the rest of society that would leave these 
others without the required agential capacities. Here, standard luck 
egalitarianism and moral agency egalitarianism agree that it would be too costly 
 
13 Meijers & Vandamme (2019), 327, express related worries about Lippert-Rasmussen’s version of 
luck egalitarianism. 
14 Gheaus (2016), 10-11, makes a similar point about systematic Alpine hikers in flip-flops. See also 
Albertsen (2016a) for a discussion of this problem in relation to organ transplants. 
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to save Semolina but disagree on why this is the case. Moral agency egalitarianism 
would draw this conclusion, not because the rescue imposes costs which threaten 
the equal shares of Semolina’s co-citizens, but because it generates a tension 
between upholding the moral agency of one (imprudent) person and the moral 
agency of other members of society. Here, harshness would be a necessary 
response to protect the forward-looking moral agency of others. 
Another way of arriving at this conclusion is to note, as Andrew Williams 
helpfully does, that luck egalitarianism is open to a spectrum of interpretations 
about what weight should be given to responsibility-sensitivity. And the most 
plausible versions of luck egalitarianism (and this includes Dworkin’s version) 
place limits on the choices people can make to impose costs on themselves and 
others (Williams 2013, 68-69). Even if luck egalitarians must, by definition, hold 
people accountable for their choices in a backward-looking sense, a luck 
egalitarian society could (and should) be structured in a way so as to avoid that 
some people face terrible pay-offs if they engage in gambles such as reckless 
driving or BASE jumping (Stemplowska 2009, 246-247).15 Specifically, we would 
add, the limits and the pay-offs should be structured so that people’s forward-
looking moral agency is ensured (as long as it does not impose on that of others). 
Luck egalitarianism, modified along the lines suggested by Stemplowska and 
Williams, and coming closer to what we might call moral agency egalitarianism, 
admits that if luck egalitarianism is about treating moral agents equally (or fairly) 
as responsible choosers, it should not allow actions which have the kind of harsh 
outcomes that would impede moral agency . At least not when such outcomes 
can be avoided without compromising moral agency in other ways. This leaves 
room for the notion that harsh outcomes must be accepted in some cases—out 
of respect for past exercises of choice—but that they should not be accepted when 
they threaten forward-looking responsibility—out of respect for future exercises 
of choice.  
When viewed as a tension between the backward-looking dimensions of the 
luck/choice distinction and moral agency, the harshness critique comes more 
sharply into focus. Viewing the tension like this also makes it clearer that while 
standard luck egalitarianism fixated on backward-looking responsibility has no 
satisfactory reply, what we have called moral agency egalitarianism, is immune 
to the deeper point of the harshness objection. This version of egalitarianism is 
built around a notion of moral agency that is broader than its purely backward-
 
15 See also Stemplowska (2019), 279-280, for a particularly clear exposition of the indeterminacy of 
luck egalitarian theories with respect to costs. See also Lippert-Rasmussen (2016), 198-199. 
14 
 
looking form, prioritizing its forward-looking dimension when the two are in 
tension.  
III. Disrespect 
A second iteration of the unity thesis criticizes luck egalitarians for overlooking 
the disrespectful intrusiveness into people’s personal choices which accompanies 
their emphasis on backward-looking responsibility. This occurs, according to the 
critique, in the process of evaluating the degree to which people are responsible 
for their situation, leading to situations where people have to reveal their 
failings—so-called “shameful revelations” (Wolff 1998). And asking people to 
disclose their failings in important areas of life is disrespectful and is likely to 
cause them shame (Anderson 1999). As Jonathan Wolff puts it, considering the 
case of unemployed citizens, revealing their inability to obtain a job in seeking to 
qualify for unemployment benefits; “But think of how it must feel—how 
demeaning it must be – to have to admit to oneself and then convince others that 
one has not been able to secure a job, despite one’s best efforts, at a time when 
others appear to obtain employment with ease” (Wolff 1998, 114).  
The emphasis on backward-looking responsibility, in the sense of determining 
people’s distributive entitlements based on their past exercises of individual 
choice, according to Wolff, leads to a conflict between fairness and respect 
because holding people responsible entails measuring the degree to which they 
are accountable.16 Anderson echoes the same critique, when she argues that luck 
egalitarianism, “makes demeaning and intrusive judgments of people’s capacities 
to exercise responsibility and effectively dictates to them the appropriate uses of 
their freedom” (Anderson 1999, 289).  
The disrespect objection has often been comparatively downplayed and most 
critics as well as defenders of luck egalitarianism have headlined the harshness 
critique.17 This is understandable, in a sense, because the accusation of disrespect 
seems to be directed, not against the responsibility-sensitive distributive pattern 
recommended by luck egalitarians, but the disrespectful treatment that 
accompanies its unconditional institutionalization.  
On further reflection, however, the tension arises due to a need to evaluate 
whether people are in fact moral agents, when this, in itself, constitutes a failure 
to treat them as moral agents (Carter 2011). As Ian Carter notes, following a 
similar line of argument as Wolff; “Respect, on this alternative interpretation, is 
 
16 Wolff (1998), 103, refers to the claim under attack here as the “Lexical Priority of Fairness Thesis”. 
17 See Albertsen (2016a); Knight 2005; Lippert-Rasmussen (2016), 192-194; and Firth (2013) for 
notable exceptions. 
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a substantive moral attitude that involves abstaining from looking behind the 
exteriors people present to us as moral agents” (Carter 2011, 551). That persons 
exercise moral agency compels a certain treatment from others; of courtesy—out 
of respect for this capacity—and trust—out of respect for how this capacity is 
presented. The intrusive policies, to which Wolff and Anderson point, are 
disrespectful in both these ways, expressing both a lack of common courtesy and 
a lack of trust.  
There are two dimensions to this objection. First, the disrespectful intrusion 
occurs in an area concerning the very capacities that makes someone an agent. 
The treatment, then, fails to protect “that agent from exposure to empirical 
assessments of the very capacities in which that agent consists” (Carter 2011, 558). 
In Wolff’s example, our unemployed citizen is forced to reveal the lack of 
marketable talents—and in a society, in which employment is central to self-
sustainment and self-respect (which, arguably, it is in most societies), this is a 
major threat to one’s agency. This is because having a reasonable level of self-
respect and social standing are both necessary components in being able to act 
as a moral agent in a society. It is not the mere having to reveal one’s bad luck, 
then, but having to reveal one’s unfortunate inadequacies in areas that are 
intimately tied to being, and being regarded as, an agent with plans and purposes 
and capacities for pursuing these. Call this The Agency Erosion Problem. 
Carter claims that this places limits on what can count as proper equalisanda of 
egalitarian justice—i.e. it limits what can count as an appropriate currency to be 
distributed (Carter 2011, 562). Specifically, it precludes those currencies that 
require determining people’s relative level of agential capacities in a manner that 
erodes their status as an agent. Carter argues that luck egalitarians exhibit this 
problem and cannot compensate people for being worse off through no fault of 
their own when it comes to agential capacities without violating “opacity respect” 
because determining levels of individual responsibility often involves such 
violations (ibid, 568). The Agency Erosion Problem, then, is concerned with 
distributive outcomes of a particular kind - namely, ones that are tied to the 
exercise of moral agency.  
In response to this objection, luck egalitarians have attempted to internalize the 
value of respect to which Wolff points (Axelsen & Bidadanure 2019). Luck 
egalitarians, after all, are concerned with equalizing something that they deem 
valuable; be it resources, concern, or opportunity for welfare (Dworkin 2000, 
Lippert-Rasmussen 2016, or Arneson 1989). Following this route, luck egalitarians 
can argue that self-respect, privacy, and not feeling shamed, humiliated, and 
intruded upon are, indeed, important values subject for potential inclusion 
within the equalisandum of justice—that which is to be equalized in a just society. 
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In this vein, some argue that prominent luck egalitarians, such as Cohen, already 
include this in their currency of egalitarian justice (Lippert-Rasmussen 2012, 127-
128); that they could incorporate relational goods like respect within their 
framework (Lippert-Rasmussen 2016, 195); or that they should do so (Cordelli 
2014; Gheaus 2016).18 On this broader view of luck egalitarianism, Wolff’s 
unemployed citizen who is forced to reveal shameful information about herself 
might be considered worse off than others in a morally relevant manner through 
no fault of her own—thus, because she cannot get a job, she is worse off both 
because she has no job and because this situation forces her to submit to 
shamefully revealing her inadequacies. 
Including “respect-standing” and other relational goods within what is to be 
equalized does seem to lessen the sting of the disrespect critique, since it 
decreases the degree to which people’s moral agency is threatened by 
determinations of choice and luck. If intrusive policies can only be pursued when 
they do not make people worse off in terms of our chosen currency of justice and 
this includes considerations of self-respect and not feeling ashamed or 
humiliated, the tension seems to be defused.19 We think that this is a promising 
strategy for luck egalitarians and that respect for moral agency requires such an 
internalization of the distributive outcomes of disrespectful treatment into the 
equalisandum – and, building on the lessons drawn from the harshness objection, 
such internalization should focus on the forward-looking elements of avoiding 
agency-undermining disrespect. 
However, there is a second dimension to this objection. Thus, the threat to moral 
agency from the unemployment officer in Wolff’s example, comes not only from 
the impact on citizen self-respect. Rather, in departing from a position of doubt 
and mistrust, the unemployment officer fails to treat the unemployed citizen as 
a moral agent in virtue of this treatment alone. In asking the jobless citizen to 
justify herself and her claims, casting doubt on her legitimacy, the state agent is 
treating the citizen as though her agential status and sense of justice are in doubt. 
Here, then, the tension arises because emphasizing the luck/choice distinction 
involves treating people with disrespect that is inappropriate for moral agents—
by forcing them to expose deficiencies in their agential capacities and by treating 
their claims with distrust. Like the Agency Erosion Problem, this issue concerns 
a failure of respect for moral agency. But whereas the previous problem focused 
on the agency-threatening outcome, this one is not tied to distributive outcomes. 
 
18 See also Barry (2006), 93-97. 
19 On the other hand, one might argue that this solution merely pushes back the question – since 
we would still need to know whether people’s feeling of shame was due to luck or choice. 
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Instead, this problem concerns how a moral agent must, deontically, be treated. 
Call this The Disrespectful Treatment Problem. 
Note, further, that the solution noted above of internalizing the distributive 
outcomes of disrespectful treatment into the equalisandum only targets the 
Agency Erosion Problem and does not address the Disrespectful Treatment 
Problem. In order to see this, consider the following example, in which the 
Disrespectful Treatment Problem is isolated from its potential, agency-eroding 
outcome: 
Betting on Failure: in a government-run unemployment agency, a 
group of employees have started a monthly sweepstake in which they 
attempt to guess which newly-unemployed citizens will fail to get a 
job before the end of the month. They scrutinize their qualifications 
and backgrounds, each betting on one jobless person whom they 
deem least likely to succeed. The group of employees has no direct 
contact with the relevant unemployed citizens, so the sweepstake has 
no effect on them. 
Now, clearly Betting on Failure would be more problematic if the unemployed 
citizens knew about the sweepstake and felt ashamed and suffered losses of self-
respect as a result or if the employees could seek to jeopardize the employment 
possibilities of the citizens to increase their chances of winning the bet—that is, 
if the Agency Erosion Problem remained.  
But the Disrespectful Treatment Problem targets the failure to treat someone as 
a moral agent, as a chooser. And this is distinct from the consequences of such 
treatment. That is, what is unjust about a society in which some are treated 
disrespectfully, cannot be captured by focusing only on the obstacles to their 
abilities to choose and act as moral agents it may create (Schemmel 2012). Rather, 
this society is permeated by unjust ways of relating to or the wrong attitudes 
towards moral agents. Betting on Failure highlights the non-distributive 
dimensions of political morality that the luck egalitarian focus on outcomes 
overlooks.20 The government employees in our example are acting wrongly, and 
indeed the institution is unjust, regardless of whether it affects the unemployed 
citizens. And this is because their actions fail to express the appropriate respect 
for the moral agency of the unemployed citizens—specifically, in their efforts to 
secure a job.  
If moral agency is the value upon which a just society is built as we claim, citizens 
of such a society must not merely have a share of resources that adequately 
 
20 See Tomlin (2015) and Moles & Parr (2018) for illuminating thoughts on this distinction. 
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reflects their agential status, but also be treated as moral agents by the state and 
in society’s other primary institutions. A respect for moral agency, then, should 
not merely constrain the currency of the distribution, as Carter believes, but also 
the way in which citizens relate to each other (and how the state relates to its 
citizens). This is the second central implication of the unity thesis. 
Luck egalitarians might object that the problem is due to the injustice of societies 
of our present world—not to luck egalitarianism. Thus, as Joanna Firth (2013) 
argues, distributive justice theorists of a luck egalitarian inclination might admit 
that conditional benefits would involve disrespectful treatment and lead to 
shameful revelations in current societies, but that this would not be the case in 
an ideal society governed by luck egalitarian principles.21 In such a society, she 
argues, citizens would not be ashamed of revealing their inability to get a job 
since they will hold luck egalitarian beliefs, which entails that “[a] person’s deep 
value does not depend on her level of marketable natural talents” (Firth 2013, 
38).22 In a society, in which people were shaped by luck egalitarian institutions 
that embody the value that one should not be worse-off due to bad luck, it seems 
reasonable, in other words, to assume that they would feel less ashamed about 
revealing their unlucky inadequacies and, indeed, that evaluating their degree of 
past responsibility would be less disrespectful.  
We can imagine Firth’s stipulated luck egalitarian ideal in two different ways. In 
one version, evaluations of responsibility and moral agency are omnipresent in 
society. Because people are so accustomed to this process and hold luck 
egalitarian beliefs, they do not feel ashamed or disrespected even when these 
evaluations are performed with a lack of common courtesy or trust. It should be 
clear that such a society would not avoid the Disrespectful Treatment Problem 
and would not, on our account, show proper respect for moral agency—or, as 
Firth puts it, for a person’s deep value.  
In another version of the ideal society, however, the luck egalitarian ethos 
prevents not only feelings of shame but also intentions and attitudes of disrespect. 
Evaluations of responsibility and moral agency are constrained by trust in and 
respect for people’s capacities. In incorporating a concern for non-distributive 
dimensions of justice, this version of a luck egalitarian society would show 
appropriate respect for moral agency and would preclude, for example, the 
situation imagined in Betting on Failure. The upshot is that the disrespect 
objection does not preclude the luck egalitarian use of the luck/choice 
distinction. But, like with the harshness objection, it constrains its use.  
 
21 See also Knight (2005), 65, and Wolff (2010), section 3.5. 
22 See also Lippert-Rasmussen (2016), 192. 
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Accommodating the disrespect objection, then, means reaching for non-
distributive elements of morality. And indeed, Cohen, advocates both the 
importance of community and the establishment of an egalitarian ethos, which 
sees citizens internalizing concern for the plight of their fellow citizens, in his 
ideal egalitarian society (2008; 2009). Similarly, Dworkin’s central claim that the 
state must treat its citizens with “equal concern and respect” (2000) looks as 
though it could contain non-distributive, interpersonal elements besides its 
distributive recommendation of equality of resources. There is a foundation, 
then, in the luck egalitarian canon on which an expansion of the conception of a 
just society to include non-distributive elements of respect for moral agency 
could be constructed.23 Both Cohen’s ethos and Dworkin’s concern and respect 
could, when appreciated in the light of the full force of the disrespect objection, 
be reconceived to ensure that the treatment to which our unemployed citizens 
were subjected in Betting on Failure was prevented. We argue that there are good 
reasons for such a re-conception and that doing so would, once again, move us 
towards an egalitarianism more firmly anchored in moral agency—what we have 
called moral agency egalitarianism. 
But, doing so would also involve stepping beyond the outcome-oriented elements 
of the luck/choice distinction and onto the deeper ground of moral agency—and 
luck egalitarians have not been sufficiently explicit about the importance of doing 
so, thus far. The second instantiation of the unity thesis suggests that justice has 
both distributive and treatment-related elements—and the luck/choice 
distinction, as it is standardly used in luck egalitarianism, gives us poor guidance 
about the latter.24 This is because, as we saw, treatment flowing from the 
luck/choice distinction may erode moral agency and disrespect moral agents. 
This casts doubt, once again, on the claim that the backward-looking, distributive 
dimensions of this distinction fully capture the justice-relevant concerns that 
arise between moral agents. 
IV. Conclusion 
This article is not an argument against responsibility-sensitive distributive 
justice. On the contrary, we acknowledge that justice demands holding persons 
responsible for their individual choices when and because this is one way of 
respecting their moral agency. The argument can be summed up in the following 
way. The basic entities of justice are moral agents. Therefore, the moral bedrock 
 
23 Something similar could be said of Larry Temkin’s claim that “sentient individuals are not merely 
the objects of moral concern but also the source of moral concern and values” (2003a, 778). 
24 See Bidadanure (2016); Elford (2017); Lippert-Rasmussen (2018); and Moles & Parr (2018) for 
thoughts about how political morality may contain both elements. 
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of justice is respect for moral agents. It follows that any avoidable situation that 
fails to respect moral agency—such as allowing distributive outcomes that leave 
persons without the means to exercise moral agency or failing to treat persons 
with the respect appropriate for moral agents—involves an injustice.   
The objections levelled against luck egalitarianism are not separate and scattered 
stones but stem from the same ground of the unity thesis. This realization allows 
us to appreciate their force more clearly. The emphasis on the luck/choice 
distinction and the luck egalitarian fixation with backward-looking 
responsibility-sensitive distributive justice is sometimes in tension with more 
fundamental commitments to moral agency. Luck egalitarians could, in reply to 
the unity thesis, give up the commitment to moral agency. But many would, we 
take it, be dissatisfied with that result. Instead, we argue, the narrow focus on 
backward-looking responsibility of luck egalitarianism should be discarded, and 
responsibility-sensitive justice should be broadened to include and emphasize 
forward-looking opportunities for moral agency and the respectful treatment of 
moral agents. By reflecting and emphasizing a broader vision of moral agency in 
this way, a society committed to justice more coherently embodies its grounding 
value.25 
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